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Capitalist
28-03-2005, 10:13 AM
This essay is by Gary Hoover.He founded Bookstop, which he later sold to Barnes and Noble. Then he founded Hoover's Online, which he later sold to Dunn and Bradstreet. [u]It shows how a big player can lose its edge pretty quickly.</u>

Sears and the game of retailingGary Hoover
September 25, 2003

Suppose for a second that retailing is a game, not unlike Monopoly or one of the rummy style card games such as Canasta. If you can get Boardwalk and its neighbors, or all the houses on one block, and hold them, you are in fat city. In a game like Canasta, it doesn't matter whether you have eights or kings as long as you have seven of them and hold onto them.

Let's look at Sears' hand thirty years ago. What did it have?
It had an incredibly high level of trust with its customers, and those customers represented almost every household in America. No company in the world sold more goods directly to consumers.

It had large stores spread all across the nation - everyone knew where their closest Sears store was, how to get there, where to park. It was a part of everyday life. (The only important exception was New York City.)

They built this status first with their mail order operation, so everyone also knew that you didn't have to get to a Sears store to shop with them. No matter where you lived, the full richness of the Sears assortment was available to you.

That richness was the second source of their strength. Coming out of
World War II, Sears' leadership saw the pending rise of the American
suburbs. They built those big stores with lots of parking in locations accessible to the new suburbia. But most important, they focused those stores on what might be broadly termed home goods - appliances, tools,and automotive products. In these categories, Sears was unassailable. As recently as the 1970s, the Sears' Diehard battery was one of the greatest store-brand successes of all time. Kenmore, Coldspot,Craftsman, and other Sears brands ruled their categories. Their main venture outside merchandise - Allstate Auto Insurance - was a perfect match.

Given that everyone in America (except those New Yorkers) was buying
their washers, dryers, lawn mowers, and tires at Sears, the company had enormous traffic. Expanding upon longstanding catalog traditions, the company offered that traffic a multitude of ancillary categories - from underwear to popcorn. But these were not the core strengths of the company. Sears' run of aces was solidly in home products.

Most of important of all, because of this collection of strengths and
traditions, Sears had meaning - Sears stood for something, and everyone in America knew what it was.

Of course, when you are playing a game, certainly one like retailing,
you aren't playing by yourself. There are two things to think about -the changing "environment" (that really means changing customers) and the changing competition.

So what happened to Sears' fundamental environment in the last 30 years?
First, people showed a continuing love of the general merchandise store. Wal-Mart today is as strong (in terms of market share) as Sears ever was. Costco and Target are not doing too badly, either.
Next, an aging baby boom moved from apartments to houses and from
smaller houses to bigger houses and from smaller yards to bigger yards. Overall, they continued their long-term flood to the suburbs, and sometimes even to small towns and semi-rural areas (close to Sears'roots).

These changes drove Sears' sweet spot through the roof. Automotive,
appliances (including home electronics), and hardware took off. Most
remarkable is the fact that a hardware store chain (admittedly on
steroids) called Home Depot is now the world's second largest retailer. Best Buy is doing over $20 Billion a year in sales and Autozone does more than $5 billion (and has some of the highest gross margins in retailing).

In this environment, a retail chain with excellent familiar locations,with high levels of consumer trust, with convenient general merchandise "one stop shopping" but wit

belgarion
28-03-2005, 01:49 PM
Superfically, WHS and Sears look like a reasonable comparision, at least IMHO. But perhaps WHS problems are more about following WalMart than neglecting their brand. (WalMart are supply chain and cost cutting freaks whereas Sears was about none-too-smart diversification.)

Just a couple of further points Id like to make ...


quote:The company then sat firmly on its laurels, taking its good cards for granted and looking for new realms to conquer - residential real estate by buying Coldwell Banker, stock brokerage by buying Dean Witter, building heights by building the Sears Tower. Nobody protected Boardwalk. They even completely folded the direct selling organization - mail order - that they had pioneered.


This para sums up Sears' failure for me. A newly appointed CEO should do three things:

1. They look to change, morph and transform the organisation. It doesn't matter how good it is. It can always be better. This skill to moving organisations is to do it in a manageable way. Which leads me to my second point.

2. To change an organisation, first one must recognise what makes it good and what makes it not so good. A good CEO will understand BOTH the former and the later. More importantly, he/she will recognise the individuals behind the ideas, understand why the implemenation of those ideas was either successful or not so successful. He/She will support the 'ideas' people to further charge. Which leads me to my third point.

3. Charging organisations takes time. All CEOs are faced with a barage of 'business cases' selling ideas that will lead to further profits. The skill a CEO needs is the ability to recognise timeframes. Some ideas, while infinately cool and likely to be successful, may take time and cash resources that are not available. Conversely, cheap, less flashy solutions may not fit the longer term strategy but must be deployed simply to keep pace with the market. Then there's the 'non-core' business initiatives, Sears is the classic example, where partners should have been found. Partners with core skills in the non-core business.

All the above requires business knowledge of what works and what doesn't and when to employ it. Good businesses grow these people ... bad ones employ lawyers, bankers, (americans ;)) or business people with completely inappropriate business backgrounds (e.g. growth stars, cost-cutting stars, political animals, 'situation'-developers, etc.)

Sears' failure is basically down to the three points above. It would be 'convenient' to say that WHS is doing the same but its not really the case. WHS have stuck to their core business. Yes, the purchases to get into Oz weren't that clever, but they've stuct to their guns and concentrated on their core business for the most part.

Great CEOs have 'core-business' expirience, ethics, a sound grasp of history and just keep learning. Saddly, I've met only a few.

winner69
28-03-2005, 07:10 PM
Good article Cap

The article mentioned how important it was to think about the changing "environment" (that really means changing customers) and the changing competition.

WHS presentations around the Red Sheds at least acknowledge they do have changing customers and changing competitors. Like they do recognise that consumers do buy the cheap luxury look alike items and they now openly admit that Mitre 10, Bunnings and (yes) Hallensteins are competitors.

But it is their response that is interesting ... they do not appear to be differentiating themselves from these competitors but coming closer ... which could be dangerous as they enter new territory.

Another article I came across recently about Walmarts and Home Depots highlighted there is a point in time when getting bigger actually starts to lessen real added shareholder value, ie economic profit declines as footprint goes up.

This is also happening with WHS currently ... all those new big stores and extra footprint are generating less sales/profit per square metre with the subsequent impact on overall profitability

It will be interesting to see where the new management of WHS does eventually take it

Snoopy
28-03-2005, 08:57 PM
quote:Originally posted by Capitalist

This essay is by Gary Hoover.He founded Bookstop, which he later sold to Barnes and Noble. Then he founded Hoover's Online, which he later sold to Dunn and Bradstreet. [u]It shows how a big player can lose its edge pretty quickly.</u>


An interesting article, and may I say that I do agree with the premise that an existing dominant player in retail can lose their edge. However, 'quickly' in this context seems to mean twenty to thirty years. So I'm hardly going to need a hare trigger on my broker sell button to react...

Other than the obvious parallel of Sears being the dominant US retailer in the 70s and WHS being the dominant NZ retailer in the noughties I am struggling to see how the detail in the article refers to the WHS though.

I have done a 'selective editing' job on the article to show you what I mean...


quote:
Sears and the game of retailingGary Hoover
September 25, 2003

First, people showed a continuing love of the general merchandise store.


...which is exactly the market WHS are in. First big tick for WHS.


quote:
So what did happen?

As usual, the first cause of failure was success. Just as it appeared that the world's largest retailer would probably always be number one,they named a lawyer as CEO.


New senior management team lead by retailer Ian Morris, with not a lawyer among them. Second big tick for the WHS


quote:
The company then sat firmly on its laurels, taking its good cards for
granted and looking for new realms to conquer


Ian Morris is not resting on his laurals with the Red Sheds. He is
transforming them. Third big tick for WHS.


quote:
So how is Sears doing today? Can the present management turn this huge ship around?

Let's look at what they have done.

1. They acquired a good name (Land's End) in mail order apparel after
they dropped mail order themselves. Apparel was never a strong card in their deck, never a key reason people went to Sears. Well, maybe
coveralls and work shoes.


WHS have dropped the 'weak' names Silly Sollys and Crazy Clints. Fourth big tick for the Warehouse.


quote:
2. They put a lot of money in building stores outside their own stores that were in their core areas - hardware, automotive, furniture - but then folded or sold all of these, culminating in the recently announced sale of NTB tire and battery stores.


WHS are increasingly building their stores as 'stand alone' destination stores. They are not miniturizing into the malls. Fifth big tick for WHS.


quote:
3. They aped Home Depot's Expo concept with "the Great Indoors" which
doesn't appear to be going anywhere.


They are not applying 'theme expos' in sto

Toddy
28-03-2005, 10:24 PM
Yes, maybe doing everything right.
But this does not mean that the WHS represents good value at current levels.
Just look at teh PE ratio..... crazy.

Snoopy
28-03-2005, 11:26 PM
quote:Originally posted by Toddy

Yes, maybe doing everything right.
But this does not mean that the WHS represents good value at current levels.
Just look at the PE ratio..... crazy.


FWIW Toddy I agree. This is the principal reason why when I was looking at my (2) NZ retail investments, I made the decision to increase my holding in RBD and not buy more WHS.

Even though my long term trend mathematical model tells me that WHS will ultimately be the better investment, I just couldn't turn down the far less demanding forecast P/E that RBD offered.

SNOOPY