Yeah found that out twice, signed up to a "special" deal, then without telling you bring something out better and cheaper while you're still on the original plan and paying more
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Why do my Spark shares drop in price 5-10% every autumn and spring then rise up the same again in midsummer and midwinter?
How many of you sell at the middle and end of each year and buy again at the equinox?
Graph shows that generally lows are when the stock goes ex dividend. I buy on the intersection with the lower trend line.
Attachment 15008
Traders delight… so time to jump in or not quite right?..
I’ve noticed it drops ex dividend. But the dividend is only 2 or 3 percent. Why the 5 to 10 pc drop? Naive Henny Penny shareholders? “The sky is falling on my head!”
Gross Dividend Calculations
FY2020 P1, FY2020 P2:
12.5c (Ordinary, 75% imputed) = 9.375c (FI) + 3.125c (NI) = 9.375c/0.72 +3.125c = 13.021c +3.125c = 16.15c (gross dividend)
FY2021 P1, FY2021 P2, FY2022 P1, FY2022P2, FY2023 P1:
12.5c (Ordinary, 100% imputed) = 12.5c (FI) = 12.5c/0.72 = 17.36c = 17.36c (gross dividend)
FY2023 P2, FY2024 P1, FY2024 P2:
13.5c (Ordinary, 100% imputed) = 13.5c (FI) = 13.5c/0.72 = 18.75c = 18.75c (gross dividend)
Year Dividends as Declared Gross Dividends Gross Dividend Total FY2020 12.5c + 12.5c 16.15c + 16.15c 32.30c FY2021 12.5c + 12.5c 17.36c + 17.36c 34.72c FY2022 12.5c + 12.5c 17.36c + 17.36c 34.72c FY2023 12.5c + 13.5c 17.36c + 18.75c 36.11c FY2024 13.5c + 13.5c 18.75c + 18.75c 37.50c
Now we come to selecting the capitalisation rate. Spark Bonds (SPF570, SPF590 and SPF600) are currently trading in the secondary market at yields of around 5.1-5.3%. That is well down on the 6% of September 2023
Even so, Spark shareholders need a greater implied return than that, to compensate for the risks equity ownership. Having said that, from an operational perspective Spark is a very stable company. So I think a 6.5% gross interest return on your shares bought, in today's slightly less high interest rate environment, would still be fair. The five year historical average gross dividend received by shareholders from Spark was:
175.35 / 5 = 35.07c
The capitalised dividend value of Spark (fair value) is therefore: 35.07c/0.065 = $5.40
Of course no self respecting value investor would target 'fair value' as a price purchase target. Value investors want a discount! For a utility type investment like Spark I think a discount of 10% is reasonable target. So I am setting my target purchase price at $5.40 x 0.9 = $4.86. With the share closing at $4.76 on Friday, 'Ring ring'?
SNOOPY
Presentation link:
https://investors.sparknz.co.nz/Form...mary-FINAL.pdf
Accompanying Conference Call Link:
https://investors.sparknz.co.nz/Form...nouncement.mp3
This is not a 'time sequential report' of the above presentation and accompanying conference call. I have taken the broad reporting subject areas discussed in the first half of the conference call, and added to those topics some 'analyst questions asked answers', from the latter half.
Comparative financial reporting numbers used are adjusted by removing FY2023 one offs:
a/ Stripping out the expenses incurred in closing down Spark Sport, AND
b/ Removing the profits from the cell tower sell down.
However, opex costs for Spark Sport have not been removed from the prior comparative period.
1/ Spark net profit was down 4.8% on the pcp (HY2023), due to increased interest payments and lease costs (principally to Connexa - the 'sold down to' mobile phone tower infrastructure provider).
2/ Cashflow was down on the pcp, due to the larger share of the investment capital program, including investments in CRP (the 'cost reducing program'?), going through in the first half year. $286m of this years capital investment from a $510-$530m capital investment .program was spent, including the Takanini data centre expansion, completed in the first half of the financial year. The key driver of cashflow going forwards will be the improvement in EBITDA. Marketing and acquisition costs are incurred 'up front', before the customers 'come on board' in the second half year. Mobile price increases, larger Data Centre scale, and IT product growth (following on from a pcp decline), should improve the top line in 2HY2024. 'New product offerings' often include greater automation, and that in turn lowers the cost base going forwards. Mobile handset sales saw a more subdued retail environment in the first half.
3/ Mobile remains central to Spark's growth., +6.3% c.f. prior period (HY2023), or $30m. Service revenue and pay-monthly ARPU growth was driven by price increases, connection growth, and $7m of growth in roaming revenues, which are tracking above pre-Covid levels (now at 107% of that total, which from an outbound perspective is 'sitting pretty high', even if inbound remains subdued). The Spark mobile brands (which include Skinny) captured 47% of total connection growth in the half. But travellers re-entering the market had a negative effect on ARPU. Overall, Spark mobile market share was 44% of mobile service revenue over the period.
Enterprise segment (business) revenue (ARPU) declined, reflecting the highly competitive nature of this market. Some 'shedding of lines', -not losing a customer altogether but reducing the number of lines in and out of a business-, added to the revenue loss.
Data over the 4G network is increasing exponentially and the investment in 5G, while not necessarily earnings positive while being rolled out, can be seen as 'future proofing' the whole mobile network. If Spark were not spending as much on 5G today, then they would be spending more on 4G instead. Once 5G service is available throughout the country, then it can be 'charged for' at a price premium.
A Connexia (mobile phone tower owning company) build program for new towers is underway, albeit at a low 'start up' level. Downstream lease cost increases for Spark are expected to be modest over the next couple of years, more in line with inflation. For Spark today, $5m is the 'net loss' compared to the comparative period connected to Connexia (or at least the costings in the Spark share of this) and RCG (the combined rural build out program venture with 2 degrees and 'One NZ'), with by far the majority of that extra money being Connexia related. This extra cost reflects the 'start up phase' of these two build out programs, with this 'incremental loss' expected to improve over time.
The impact of Connexia on Spark NPAT level is relatively neutral. Spark avoids depreciation, because they don't own the towers any more. There is a lower interest bill, because the capital injection associated with the sale has reduced the need for borrowing. The biggest component of the future 'tower programmed build out' is still a couple of years away.
4/ Wireless broadband (using Spark's own mobile network) grew to 31% of the total Spark broadband customer base.
5/ The 'total cloud revenue' was flat. But profit was up, because the cost base has been reset. A 'hybrid cloud service' was launched in the half year. The private and public cloud grew as well. But there was an $8m (or 10%) decrease in 'service management revenue', primarily due to lower public sector demand, - leading to an overall flat result.
6/ The 10MW incremental gain in Takanini data centre capacity is now being 'fully billed'. In fact, 88% of total Spark data centre capacity is already committed under contract, and has clear revenue pathways. The 'Cloud Cost Reset' will see labour cost reductions flow through to the second half. 'Hyperscaling', with respect to comments made by Spark in their own context, encompasses the size and commitments of data centres already planned by Spark, but not those an order of magnitude in size above that!
7/ High tech and virtual technology revenue, includes the 'Internet of Things', - where revenue grew strongly by 13% to $35m (now 1.8m customer connections). Several converged technology 'proof of concept' trials are underway for customers. High tech (which includes digital identification start up MATTR), is the area where most improvement in profitable execution is needed. MATTR is not expected to be commercially significant in a Spark group context, until FY2026 at the earliest. Meanwhile, there is the 'Ministry of Primary Industries' (MPI) fishing boat visual imaging project already in place, while initiatives in measuring water quality, and road network quality are potential further applications. 5G is the 'backbone investment' that will commercially enable all of this technology.
High tech data business Qrious, - encompassing professional services and virtual transformation-, has also been also impacted. But this is more a 'business environment' and 'election uncertainty' issue. Qrious is expected to 'bounce back' in 2HY2024.
8/ Spark's Digital Health operation was down, due to the public sector slowdown (principally 'Te Whatu Ora'/ 'Health NZ' related). The private sector is now seen as 'the growth opportunity here e.g. via 'private hospitals' and 'primary care'. But digitisation of government health is still 'going to occur' and 'needs to occur', indicating that growth in Spark Health has been postponed rather than cancelled. The half year downturn is more about the economic environment and the 'shift in uncertainty', that the threat of 'countrywide citizen level job cuts' and restructuring creates.
9/ The 'cost out' over FY2024, originally forecast to be $40m-$60m, including product cost decline by $5m as voice costs continue to decline, is set to be 'more than modestly' exceeded.
10/ Spark is looking for a 'return' of 9-10% ('return' meaning, a 'net operating profit after tax' over 'invested capital') on data centres once operating at capacity. Third party partners may be brought in to help fund these data centres. A 9-10% return ensures that the IRR is above WACC. The signed customer contracts include an inflation adjustment element This is a higher return that global hyperscale data centres are generating. But remember, global hyperscale is on a 'next level' compared to Spark 'hyperscale'.
11/ 'eps' is running below 'dps'. Are fully imputed dividends sustainable? 'Full imputation' is confirmed for FY2024. Looking further out, it will be the improvement of free cashflow that will be needed to support the payment of a fully imputed dividend. Increasing free cashflow is part of the business plan. This is the basis on which dividend imputation is approached. But no 'long term guidance' by Spark was given as firm on imputation.
12/ On telecommunications competition, the market remains competitive. But no significant market share swap has occurred between the 'big 3 players' in either mobile or broadband.
SNOOPY
Some bids hit today
Amongst the half year presentation questions, the above analyst's question was one that particularly caught my eye. I expressed my same concern about this matter a year ago.
Time for an update, to see if earnings really are keeping up with those increased dividends.
SNOOPY