Mercury's Hidden Power Stations (FY2022 Perspective)
EOFY2022 and we have the the former Tilt NZ based windfarms and the first stage of the Turitea wind farm 'on the books' and generating.
Mercury Windfarms EOFY2022 |
Commissioned |
Generation Capacity |
Waipipi |
2021 |
133MW |
Tararua I & II |
1998,2004 |
68MW |
Tararua III |
2007 |
93MW |
Mahinerangi I |
2011 |
36MW |
Turitea North |
2021 |
119MW |
Total Completed Capacity |
|
449MW |
Capacity generation will not be achieved unless all of the windfarms are running 24/7. This isn't going to happen. So I will use a capacity reduction factor of 43.2% (see post 1321) to account for this. Combining this information with other information on existing hydro-electric and geothermal energy generation capacity and utilisation gives us an EOFY2021 picture.
Generation Asset Class |
Existing Generation Capacity |
Usage rate |
Effective Generation Capacity |
Hydro |
1063MW |
51.4% |
546MW |
Geothermal |
463MW |
94.0% |
435MW |
Wind |
449MW |
43.2% |
194MW |
Total |
|
|
1175MW |
The yet to be constructed Turitea 2 is designed to deliver 103MW of generation capacity, or
103MW x 0.432 = 45MW of effective generation capacity
With the equivalent of seven of these stations already funded to be constructed (post 1460), the incremental value embedded in Mercury shares which is already embedded above existing production capacity is:
1 + (7 x45MW)/(1175MW) = 1.268 or +26.8%
Giving value to some of Mercury's own consented power stations, which apart from Turitea South, have not been given the go ahead yet is a strange concept. But it does appear the market is doing just that. Because IMO, the current MCY share price is very difficult to justify on Mercury's earnings today. My explanation is that 'everyone needs power' and the country is on the path of 'renewable electrification'. So even though not all of the Mercury consented power stations are yet built, there is reasonable certainty that they will be. And people are prepared to pay for 'certain cashflow', even if it is a few years away.
SNOOPY
Capitalised Dividend Valuation (FY2022.5 view) Part 1: Data
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
Financial Year |
Normalised 'eps' |
Net Dividend Paid (per share) |
Gross Dividend Paid (per share) |
2016 |
10.3c |
8.4c + 2.5c(S) + 5.7c |
11.67c + 3.47c + 7.92c = 23.06c |
2017 |
12.1c |
8.6c + 2.88c(NI,S) + 5.8c |
11.94c + 4.0c + 8.06c = 24.00c |
2018 |
14.0c |
8.8c + 5.0c(S) + 6.0c |
12.22c + 6.94c +8.33c = 27.49c |
2019 |
11.7c |
9.1c + 6.2c |
12.64c + 8.61c = 21.25c |
2020 |
11.6c |
9.3c + 6.4c |
12.92c + 8.89c = 21.81c |
2021 |
10.1c |
9.4c + 6.8c |
13.06c + 9.44c = 22.50c |
2022 |
11.6c |
10.2c + 8.0c |
14.17c + 11.11c = 25.28c |
Notes:
1/ The above 'per share' table is based on the 1,400m MCY shares on issue.
2/ (NI) means 'Not Imputed', (S) means 'Special Dividend'.
3/ 'Normalised eps' = 0.72x(EBITDAF-DA-I) / 1,400 shares on issue
For this valuation technique, I work with all dividends. Despite special dividends not being repeatable, they are paid frequently. And, using this particular valuation method, I have not recognised these special dividends as a benefit for shareholders in any other way.
From the table, the average annual normalised gross dividend payment over FY2017 to FY2021 inclusive has been:
(24.00c+27.49c+21.25c+21.81c+22.50)/5 = 23.41c
From the table, the average annual normalised gross dividend payment over FY2018 to FY2022 inclusive has been:
(27.49c+21.25c+21.81c+22.50+25.28)/5 = 23.67c
Big Announcement: I am changing my dividend analysis by looking at the previous four years of dividends paid, not the previous five years as before. In an analysis such as this, there is always a balance between gaining enough data to cover a 'business cycle', but not gathering so much data that the oldest becomes too historic and irrelevant to be a predictor of future dividends going forwards. Competitor Contact Energy has announced that they will be paying dividends on the basis of cashflows from the previous four years. I don't have a strong view as the whether using four or five years worth of dividend data is preferable. But since Contact has chosen four years, and they probably have a better idea of the better representative earnings period than I do, I am from now going with four years.
Financial Year |
Normalised 'eps' |
Net Dividend Paid (per share) |
Gross Dividend Paid (per share) |
2019 |
11.7c |
9.1c + 6.2c |
12.64c + 8.61c = 8.61c |
2020 |
11.6c |
9.3c + 6.4c |
12.92c + 8.89c = 21.81c |
2021 |
10.1c |
9.4c + 6.8c |
13.06c + 9.44c = 22.50c |
2022 |
11.6c |
10.2c + 8.0c |
14.17c + 11.11c = 25.28c |
2023 |
?c |
12.0c + ?c |
16.67c + ?c = ?c |
Notes:
1/ The above 'per share' table is based on the 1,400m MCY shares on issue.
2/ (NI) means 'Not Imputed', (S) means 'Special Dividend' (not used for FY2022.5 data) .
3/ 'Normalised eps' = 0.72x(EBITDAF-DA-I) / 1,400 shares on issue
For this valuation technique, I work with all dividends. Despite special dividends, when declared, not being repeatable, they are paid frequently. And, using this particular valuation method, I have not recognised these special dividends as a benefit for shareholders in any other way.
From the table, the average annual normalised gross dividend payment over FY2019.5 to FY2022,5 inclusive has been:
(8.61c+21.81c+22.50c+25.28c+16.67c)/4 = 23.72c
SNOOPY
Capitalised Dividend Valuation (FY2022.5 view) Part 2: Calculation
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
This is an alternative Capitalised Dividend valuation to my post 1443, now using a 5.0% gross yield for utilities, as I have just done in my recent Contact Energy valuation.
So I can calculate a capitalised earnings valuation for MCY as follows.
23.67c / (0.05) = $4.73 (based on averaged, dps)
However, this valuation does not take into account the any not yet operational wind farms for which the capital is already built into today's balance sheet. Adjusting for that (my post 1442) my fair value for MCY today is:
$4.73 x 1.230 = $5.82
MCY closed on the market on Friday 12th August at $6.50. That means I see MCY as overvalued, by 11.7%.
I have decided that using a 5.0% gross yield, as I have just done in my recent Contact Energy valuation, is an appropriate measuring stick for 'fair value' of a relatively secure cashflow utility.
So I can calculate a capitalised earnings valuation for MCY as follows. Average 'earnings per share' for the most recent four years of dividend data may be found in post 1462.
23.72c / (0.05) = $4.74 (based on averaged, dps)
However, this valuation does not take into account the any not yet operational wind farms for which the capital is already built into today's balance sheet. Adjusting for that (my post 1461) my fair value for MCY today is:
$4.74 x 1.268 = $6.01
MCY closed on the market on Thursday 18th August 2022 at $6.30. That means I see MCY as overvalued, by 4.8%.
SNOOPY
Onslow Downside for Mercury Energy: Part 1
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
The rationale for Onslow is for it to be government controlled 'reserve generation' that puts a lid on the maximum price offered into the nationwide power system. Without Onslow, this maximum price would be controlled by the gentailers who have made big money from rogue power price peaks. Peaking Thermal generation in particular would not be competitive with Onslow. But if Onslow were used all the time to flatten any wholesale power price spike, then there would be a possibility of the Onslow water supply being used up. That would remove the threat of Onslow coming on stream to reduce high spot power prices, and so defeat the whole rationale for Onslow existing in the first place. This means the 'default state' of Onslow must be to remain idle.
The post below relates to Contact Energy for the June 2022 financial year.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
I refer you back to work I did on another electricity market player where I calculated the upside of Onslow
https://www.sharetrader.co.nz/showth...l=1#post973916
+$15.62m
and offset that against the downside
https://www.sharetrader.co.nz/showth...l=1#post973765
-$208.68m
I know this analysis was somewhat simplistic (ignoring long term power contracts - not struck at the spot price - for example).
But 'long term' these two numbers still give you a feel for 'the drivers of price'. It looks to me like 'losing the upside' will have a greater effect on the viability of a renewable power generation project than 'losing the downside'.
This is a similar exercise that I did for Contact Energy, of the CEN thread in August 2022. To keep it comparable, I am going to initially look at the year FY2022 for Mercury. The purpose of this exercise is not a retrospective on the year FY2022. Instead I aim to answer the question:
"If the climatic conditions of FY2022 occurred in some future year in which Onslow was operating, how much profit (in this case EBITDAF) would Mercury lose as a result of Onslow being operational?"
When looking at Mercury there is an additional complicating factor. That being the generation side of the business has 'substantially changed' with the acquisition of the former Trustpower windfarm portfolio. This should bring positive benefits to Mercury as it will allow them to substitute wind for hydro production, thus leaving the hydro-generation assets more water to generate power when the wind is low and wholesale energy prices are consequently higher. Exactly how this wind energy for hydro substitution pans out in future years is interesting to contemplate. But that is for a separate analysis another time.
SNOOPY
Onslow Downside for Mercury Energy: Part 2
To predict the consequences of the future behaviour of the operators of Onslow, I am going to rely on Jantar's vision (espoused in the Contact Energy thread) on how this might occur
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Jantar
Onslow would not pump, or generate, based on the season, but rather it would do so based on the wholesale price. It is likely that it would be pumping when prices are less than around $50 per MWh, and generating when prices are above $100 per MWh. Because it can bid (for pumping) and offer (for generation) there would be a number of price bands, not a single price in each direction. It is likely that it would do both: Pumping overnight when prices are low, and generating during the day when prices are high on many days.
Returning to my quest trying to figure out how the profitability of Mercury Energy would be affected if Onslow is built....
Mercury provides the market with quarterly operating reports, and for the purposes of this discussion I am looking at their June 2022 quarterly report. The 'Otahuhu Wholesale Market Price and National Hydro Storage Levels' graph (misnamed because it contains wholesale price information on the Benmore node as well) contains:
a/ A trailing twelve monthly price trace of 'Wholesale Electricity Pricing' at the OTA (Otahuhu) and BEN (Benmore) nodes, based on a 12 month average 'rolling price' PLUS
b/ An accompanying trace of national (hydro) energy storage for both the current year, the previous year and a longer term historical average.
If we now move back to the 'Mercury Operating Statistics' page and cast our eye over the 'Electricity Generation' section, then we get a breakdown in unit terms of:
i/ How much energy Mercury has generated from Hydro, Geothermal and Wind generation respectively.
ii/ Into which customer classifications that energy was sold.
Of those three energy generation sources, I suspect it is only hydro that can be 'ramped up' to meet peak demand. This is consistent with the VWAP received for hydro energy in the table below being the highest of the three energy generation operational groups.
With hydro-energy, opening and closing the turbine gates are part of normal operations. So the timing of exactly when the water moves through the turbines will not affect the wear and tear on those turbines. IOW there will be no 'incremental depreciation' at the Mercury dams because of Onslow. Neither will Mercury's interest on debt change according to when Onslow operates. So IMO it is more correct to think about Onslow affecting profits at EBITDAF level, and not NPAT level.
Nevertheless, when determining peak demand pricing, it will be a thermal generation asset from another generator provider that sets the price benchmark. The price figures in the table provided are retail, which is inconsistent with the accompanying graphed wholesale prices - very annoying! This means I have to guess what the equivalent wholesale prices are using a formula estimate (1). I have repeated some information on p3 of the June 2022 quarterly report in my own table below.
-----------------
June 2022 Quarter |
Power Sold (GWh) |
Power Generated (GWh) |
VWAP Retail ($/MWh) |
VWAP Wholesale ($/MWh) (1) |
Mass Market |
636 |
|
Commercial & Industrial |
594 |
|
Line Losses |
58 |
|
CfD sell contracts (total) |
685 |
|
Hydro |
|
925 |
$199.82 |
$193.83 |
Geothermal |
|
647 |
$182.46 |
$176.99 |
Wind Power Purchase Agreement (Genesis) (2) |
|
252 |
$72.14 |
$72.14 |
Wind Spot Generation |
|
103 |
$169.07 |
$164.00 |
Buy CfD (Financial contracts) |
|
676 |
$287.92 |
? |
Total (2) |
1973 |
2351 |
From this we can work out the net power generated to be: 2351GWh - 1973GWh = 378GWh
Calculation Notes
1/ Wholesale calculation prices are retail calculation prices multiplied by: 1/1.035= 0.97. This is based on the average EBITDAF margin for Mercury Energy over the last four years (2019 to 2022 inclusive) (see 'Power Shares' thread post 1120).
2/ This is not spelt out in the report. But I believe the PPA referred to is the long term agreement between Genesis Energy and Tilt Renewables (now Mercury) where the full output of the 133MW Waipipi wind farm in South Taranaki has been agreed to be purchased by Genesis Energy for twenty years. The information as tabulated by Mercury suggests this is a retail arrangement. But this is not true. It is clearly a long term wholesale arrangement. This generation figure has therefore been not added to the power generation total, as it is outside of the day to day Mercury operational business model.
3/ The Mercury table explanatory note 7 on the 'Net Position' number states that this total "Includes all physical and financial buys and sells except spot customer purchases." I believe this note is at best misleading, because it doesn't mention that the net totals do not include wind generated under the PPA agreement with Genesis. But the net total does include wind spot generation.
------------------
Operational reporting by Mercury has been affected by the 'tyranny of averages'. If we believe Jantar's proposition that wholesale prices above $100/MWh will be capped, and all of Mercury's wholesale prices are above that level for the three month June 2022 quarter, then what does that mean for any future scenario profits? One word - disaster! Or to quantify that, the EBITDAF reduction that Onslow would have trimmed from Mercury's profits for the quarter if such hydrological and market conditions were to be repeated in the future would be:
($193.83/Mwh-$100/MWh)925,000MWh + ($176.99/MWh-$100/MWh)647,000MWh + ($164.00/MWh-$100/MWh)103,000MWh
= $86.8m + $49.8m + $6.6m = $143.2m
To put this in context EBITDAF for the full year FY2022 was $581m. Multiply that quarterly loss over four quarters and all of Mercury's profits disappear! Fortunately I do not believe such a scenario would come to pass, and this is where my 'tyranny of averages' remark becomes important. Average prices can be affected by very high short term peaks. So if, for example, wholesale electricity prices spiked to $2000/MWh for one day in a month, while on the other 30 days the price was $80/MWh, then the average price for the month would be:
(30 x $80/MWh + 1 x $2000/MWh) / 31 = $142/MWh
Taking that average figure as typical, you would expect Onslow to crash profitability for Mercury for a whole month. But if you look at the individual daily figures, you can see that in fact Onslow would only affect the profitability of Mercury on a single day of that month. The lesson here is that judging what Onslow might do to profitability of Mercury based on an 'average price for the month' would give *completely the wrong impression* on what might occur when looking at electricity pricing on a day to day basis.
Finally to return to my original question:
"How would the profitability of Mercury Energy be affected if Onslow is built?"
The answer is that from the information published by Mercury, this is unknowable. That is because we don't have any information of frequency and duration of the wholesale power price peaks, and how high the wholesale power prices rose during those peaks. Extremely disappointing. It is almost as if the quarterly operational reports were written in such a way as to deliberately obscure the prospects of the company.
SNOOPY