sharetrader
Page 254 of 291 FirstFirst ... 154204244250251252253254255256257258264 ... LastLast
Results 2,531 to 2,540 of 2905
  1. #2531
    Member glennj's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2001
    Location
    Westland based now.
    Posts
    193

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Jonboyz View Post
    Another article today in stuff about RBD I introducing Taco Bell to NZAU soon. Starting with 2 stores then 60 over the next 5yrs. Interesting that almost all comments have been negative to the idea - no one seems to like taco bell that much, and don't see them competing against existing mexican stores very well.
    Wondering whether RBD might be shoving money down a large drain?
    It remains to be see seen how Taco Bell will work in Australasia. It has been a success in Hawaii and is growing strongly in that market. For Year 2020 the effect of the roll out of Taco Bell in Australasia is not expected to make a material difference to financial performance. RBD have shown with the dropping of the Starbucks franchise and care taken with the Carl Juniors roll out that they will modify plans if that is called for.

  2. #2532
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default BT2/ INCREASING EARNINGS PER SHARE TREND (one setback allowed) [perspective 2019]

    Quote Originally Posted by Snoopy View Post
    I have used the net profit after tax, excluding non-trading items for the purpose of this comparison. Non trading items include those associated with store closures and sales transformation costs and insurance payments. These are omitted because they obscure how the business is performing on the ground.

    Net Profit/No.of Shares

    2014: $18.863m /97.871m = 19.3cps
    2015: $22.523m /97.871m = 23.0cps
    2016: $24.207m /102.871m = 23.5cps
    2017: $30.567m /122.843m = 24.9cps
    2018: $40.361m /123.629m = 32.7cps


    Conclusion: Pass Test
    I have used the net profit after tax, excluding non-trading items for the purpose of this comparison. Non trading items include those associated with store closures and sales transformation costs and insurance payments. These are omitted because they obscure how the business is performing on the ground.

    Net Profit/No.of Shares

    2015: $22.523m /97.871m = 23.0cps
    2016: $24.207m /102.871m = 23.5cps
    2017: $30.567m /122.843m = 24.9cps
    2018: $40.361m /123.629m = 32.7cps
    2019: $42.181m /124.758m = 33.8cps


    Conclusion: Pass Test

    SNOOPY
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  3. #2533
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default BT3/ RETURN ON EQUITY (at least 15% for 5 years) [perspective 2019]

    Quote Originally Posted by Snoopy View Post
    Net Profit excl. non trading / Shareholder Equity EOFY

    2014: $18.863m / $64.656m = 29.2%
    2015: $22.523m / $71.210m = 31.6%
    2016: $24.207m / $75.617m = 32.3%
    2017: $30.567m / $192.059m = 15.9%
    2018: $40.361m / $201.608m = 20.0%

    Conclusion: Pass Test

    PS For comparative trend purposes the annualized latest half year ROE is as follows:

    HY2019: ($21.853m x2) / $217.075m = 20.1%
    Net Profit excl. non trading / Shareholder Equity EOFY

    2015: $22.523m / $71.210m = 31.6%
    2016: $24.207m / $75.617m = 32.3%
    2017: $30.567m / $192.059m = 15.9%
    2018: $40.361m / $201.608m = 20.0%
    2019: $42.181m / $224.670m = 18.8%

    Conclusion: Pass Test

    SNOOPY
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  4. #2534
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default BT4/ Ability to raise margins at above the rate of inflation [perspective 2019]

    Quote Originally Posted by Snoopy View Post
    This is the net profit, excluding non-trading items, divided by the total sales for the year. Note that in a change from the 2015 perspective I am now including 'other revenue' as part of the representative ongoing revenue of the company. This is because the largest part of other revenue is money received from YUM to act as master franchise holder for Pizza Hut in New Zealand. And this is a revenue stream that will be ongoing

    2014: $18.863m / $330.399m = 5.7%
    2015: $22.523m / $372.803m = 6.0%
    2016: $24.207m / $404.095m = 6.0%
    2017: $30.567m / $517.549m = 5.9%
    2018: $40.361m / $766.289m = 5.3%

    Conclusion: Fail Test
    This is the net profit, excluding non-trading items, divided by the total sales for the year. I am now including 'other revenue' as part of the representative ongoing revenue of the company. This is because the largest part of other revenue is money received from YUM to act as master franchise holder for Pizza Hut in New Zealand. And this is a revenue stream that will be ongoing

    2015: $22.523m / $372.803m = 6.0%
    2016: $24.207m / $404.095m = 6.0%
    2017: $30.567m / $517.549m = 5.9%
    2018: $40.361m / $766.289m = 5.3%
    2019: $42.181m / $824.915m = 5.1%

    With this statistic either staying still or going backwards there is only one conclusion I can make.

    Conclusion: Fail Test

    SNOOPY
    Last edited by Snoopy; 28-07-2019 at 08:52 AM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  5. #2535
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default ROE for Overseas Venture Returns [FY2019(1) Perspective]

    Quote Originally Posted by Snoopy View Post
    Having posed the above question, I think rather than speculating on what the answer might be, I should 'do the maths' and find out.

    From the Buffettology Workbook, p149

    "We take the per share amount of earnings retained by a business for a certain period of time then compare it to any increase in per share earnings that occurred during the same period"

    In this instance the 'per share earnings retained' has been supplemented by a whole lot of new capital raised with the October 2016 cash issue. So in my judgement it is best to use the change in shareholders equity from the reporting date before the cash issue (EOFY2016) to the end of FY2018. FY2018 was the first full year of operation that included the Hawaiian and most (42) of the Australian KFC acquisition (18 more KFC stores were acquired over FY2018).

    EOFY2016 Change EOFY2018
    Normalised Earnings {A} $24.207m $40.361m
    No. of Shares {B} 102.871m 123.629m
    eps {A}/{B} 23.53c +9.12c {D} 32.65c
    Owner Equity {C} $75.617m $210,608m
    Owner Equity per share {C}/{B} 74c +96c {E} $1.70
    Return on Incremental Equity / Share {D}/{E} +9.5%

    The above should not be too much of a surprise. If the overseas operations are now roughly the size of the NZ business, the ROE before overseas acquisitions was 30% and the ROE after overseas acquisitions was 20%, then it would take a figure that low to bring the average ROE down to 20%. I would also argue that not all of that new capital has been in use all of the time (the capital raised one quarter of the way through the study period and gradually deployed over it).

    I don't know what he generally accepted value of the cost of capital of RBD is these days, But I would guess that 9.5% 'plus a bit' is still above it. I suppose what this means is that real underlying growth for RBD will be much slower going forwards compared to the recent past.
    From the Buffettology Workbook, p149

    "We take the per share amount of earnings retained by a business for a certain period of time then compare it to any increase in per share earnings that occurred during the same period"

    In this instance the 'per share earnings retained' has been supplemented by a whole lot of new capital raised with the October 2016 cash issue. I will use the change in shareholders equity from the reporting date before the cash issue (EOFY2016) to the end of FY2019. The extra year that I have brought into this comparison since my FY2018 perspective includes the Hawaiian acquisition (as before), but also the first full year that included all (61) of the Australian KFC outlets acquired to date.

    EOFY2016 Change EOFY2019
    Normalised Earnings {A} $24.207m $42.181m
    No. of Shares {B} 102.871m 124.758m
    eps {A}/{B} 23.53c +10.28c {D} 33.81c
    Owner Equity {C} $75.617m $224.670m
    Owner Equity per share {C}/{B} 74c +$1.06 {E} $1.80
    Return on Incremental Equity / Share {D}/{E} +9.7%

    The above result is disappointing. RBD has suspended dividends to fund their expansion plans, raising an incremental amount of new capital to add to the cash issue capital. I would argue that the new capital raised in the cash issue in October 2016 has now had sufficient time to be deployed. Yet the return on new capital over our comparative period has barely improved from FY2018 perspective comparison.

    I don't know what the generally accepted value of the cost of capital of RBD is in 2019. But I would guess that 9.7% not far away from it. There must now be doubt as to whether all the new capital being raised is even earning its cost of capital when deployed. This problem is hidden by the extremely strong cost of capital being earned in the legacy New Zealand business.

    SNOOPY
    Last edited by Snoopy; 07-07-2020 at 03:06 PM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  6. #2536
    Member glennj's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2001
    Location
    Westland based now.
    Posts
    193

    Default

    Thanks for the overseas ROE perspective Snoopy. The ROE post acquisitions for RBD is 18% according to one piece of info I've got. What I'll watch with is interest is to see if management can extract better ROE going forward from the largely recently acquired non NZ part of the business.

  7. #2537
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by glennj View Post
    Thanks for the overseas ROE perspective Snoopy. The ROE post acquisitions for RBD is 18% according to one piece of info I've got.
    In my post 2533 I calculate ROE for the whole company 'post acquisitions' at 18.8%. Of course that figure will vary depending on what profits you regard as representative and whether you wish to estimate a representative value of shareholder equity that covers the whole year or just take the equity figure at the end of the year.

    Quote Originally Posted by glennj View Post
    What I'll watch with is interest is to see if management can extract better ROE going forward from the largely recently acquired non NZ part of the business.
    Better than 9.7% you mean? It is not very encouraging to see this ROE figure little changed from what it was the previous year. I would have expected it to get better! I know there have been planning approval delays in Hawaii, that have delayed the refreshing of 'Taco Bell'. So maybe it will come right in the end? But the growth of Taco Bell in Hawaii seems to have been offset against a declining Pizza Hutt business in Hawaii. Furthermore I don't see any 'excuses' coming out of Australia. Couple that with Russel's comment in AR2018 on stores acquired being much less incrementally profitable than new stores built and the outlook looks to be RBD losing sales quality out of their newly invigorated Mexican powered sails.

    SNOOPY
    Last edited by Snoopy; 19-08-2019 at 09:45 PM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  8. #2538
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default AGM 2019 Address Musings

    Quote Originally Posted by blackcap View Post
    The directors did come out too and say they were targeting $1b sales (a $1 billion company) was there thing and then later the chair started talking about $1.5b. I asked the directors later that growth and sales is all good, but please keep in mind that as a S/H I am only really interested in EPS. With EPS currently at 29 cents the $8 may look a bit toppy. One of the directors was not so concerned about EPS, he was all about the growth, another I talked to was a lot more circumspect about EPS accretion being important when evaluating any potential acquisition, be it synergy potential or other.
    Looking back over blackcaps impressions from the 2018 AGM, the comment in bold stood out. This is what Buffett calls 'the institutional imperative.' In numbers terms, this is what my post 2535 shows up. In word terms it means buying up businesses to increase the headline turnover to build your own ego, rather than very selectively acquiring assets to build profits at increasing margins for shareholders.

    Looking back over the 2019 meeting addresses, Russel was very vocal about the reduction in excess packaging lessening the waste to landfill. He forgot to thank his conservationist parents for leaving the second 'l' off the end of his name though. That simple act would have saved thousands of litres of printers ink over the years.

    Russel was also keen to welcome Finaccess:

    "The significant investment that Finaccess Capital has made in the company and the unequivocal support for our growth strategy provides a firm platform for the next big push and I look forward to working together to deliver on these plans."

    What was not mentioned was that the net new capital injected as a result of Finaccess coming onto the RBD register was zero. For every dollar that Finaccess invested into RBD, the bought out shareholders removed exactly the same amount. It was at least good to see that Russel didn't curse existing shareholders that accepted the Finaccess offer for withdrawing their capital from the company!

    The actual new capital supplied to RBD was in fact due to the cancellation of the dividend. This is contrary to what was suggested in the takeover documentation of no change in dividend policy and the hints of support for future capital raisings. Don't get me wrong. I actually think that the withholding of dividends to fund growth makes sense. But I do wish Finaccess had been more up front about their plans. Maybe I have spoken too soon and the scramble to buy a beachhead into the United States mainland will see that cash issue materialise?

    The NPAT (excluding non-trading items) forecast result for the new financial year is in excess of $45 million. In 'eps' terms this equates to:

    $45m / 124.758m = 36cps

    At yesterdays close of $9.70, this represents a forecast PE ratio of:

    970 / 36 = 27

    That seems very high for a company growing earnings of 5 to 7 percent per year and whose IP consists of the detail working over of a restaurants internal layout. I was going to include choosing great restaurant locations. But RBD have admitted to many poor decisions on new restaurant opening sites in the past. Meanwhile 'YUM brands' own the IP to most of the food sold and even dictates the marketing spend.

    This FY2019 forecast represents earnings growth of $45m/$42.181m = +6.7%

    Let's hope that RBD have a strategy of under promising and over delivering!

    SNOOPY

    discl: Accepted the takeover offer and don't regret doing so (without the benefit of hindsight). Still holding the remainder of the shares I was left with.
    Last edited by Snoopy; 19-07-2019 at 09:26 AM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  9. #2539
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default MDRT: FY2015 to FY2019

    Quote Originally Posted by Dr_Who View Post
    I am about concern with the high debt level of RBD and the rising input cost (raw material - food). The fast food market is very competitive and it is hard to pass on those cost..
    There has been little interest in the debt position of RBD over recent years The above quote is from 2008! RBD has obviously survived and thrived since then. One advantage of being in the fast food industry is that accounts are normally paid 'on time' and 'in cash'. Furthermore stock turnover is rapid. This enables a fast food business to carry more debt than other retail businesses as cashflow is better. But how much debt is too much debt? Now that RBD has become a 'growth company' and dividends have been suspended, this is a question we shareholders should consider.

    My favourite debt measure remains 'MDRT'. Put simply, MDRT is the answer to the question: "If all earnings after tax were poured back into repaying the company's bank debt, how long would that take?" When working out this, we must use a company's declared IFRS profit, not a normalised profit. It takes actual cash to repay a bill!

    FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019
    Bank Term Debt $12.675m $22.550m $46.482m $166.815m $145.853m
    less Cash and Cash Equivalents ($1.575m) ($1.093m) ($70.390m) ($10.410m) ($15.034m)
    equals Net Debt {A} $11.100m $21.457m NM $156.405m $130.819m
    Declared NPAT {B} $23.830m $24.070m $25.595m $35.466m $35.741m
    MDRT {A}/{B} 0.5 yrs 0.9 yrs 0 years 4.4 yrs 3.7 yrs

    The anomaly in the table was the large amount of cash carried on the balance sheet at EOFY2017. That cash was raised for the Hawaiian settlement that was still pending at balance date. $94 of this cash was raised through the share offer dated 26th October 2016 via a 1: 5.15 cash issue. If we remove that cash from the balance sheet we can get a more representative MDRT figure:

    $70.092m / $25.595m = 2.7 yrs

    2017 was also the year that RBD announced their change of direction to become a global rather than a solely New Zealand based operator of restaurants. Underlying EPS has risen from 24.9cps to 33.8cps from FY2017 to FY2019 over the two years since. But debt has ballooned as well.

    My rule of thumb for the MDRT answer in years is:

    years < 2: Company has low debt
    2< years <5: Company has medium debt
    5< years <10: Company has high debt
    years >10: Company debt is cause for concern

    So no concerns from me with the debt at EOFY2019 levels. Yet given the poor rate of return on RBD's overseas acquisitions so far (my post 2535), the capital position after RBD's next much mooted acquisition may or may not have to be reassessed. The size of any new subsequent acquisition will be the deciding factor.

    SNOOPY
    Last edited by Snoopy; 28-07-2019 at 04:05 PM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

  10. #2540
    On the doghouse
    Join Date
    Jun 2004
    Location
    , , New Zealand.
    Posts
    9,221

    Default Implied Interest Rate for FY2019

    Quote Originally Posted by Snoopy View Post
    So no concerns from me with the debt at EOFY2019 levels. Yet given the poor rate of return on RBD's overseas acquisitions so far (my post 2535) the capital position after RBD's next much mooted acquisition may or may not have to be reassessed. The size of any new subsequent acquisition will be the deciding factor.
    For a company that has an appetite for borrowing, it is useful to know what borrowing rate they have negotiated. Note 6 of AR2019 shows that loans have been taken out in three jurisdictions: NZ $NZ12.200m, Australia $NZ77.921m and USA $NZ55,732m. The individual interest rates in each jurisdiction are not detailed. Yet based on starting and finishing total balances for the year, and knowing the overall finance bill, we can calculate an indicative figure:

    $6.797m / [1/2( $145.853m + $166.815m )] = 4.3%

    RBD has taken out several interest rate swaps, the details of which we shareholders can find under Note 6 in AR2019. Generally an interest rate swap is taken out to provide certainty in a payment stream going out into the future. However, taking out an interest rate swap also implies the loan rate is somewhat favourable. If it was not so, then the company might just eschew the derivative and rely on the spot interest rate payable at any time.

    Using indicative exchange rates of $NZD1 = $USD0.67 and $NZD1 = $AUD0.95, the total interest rates swaps in NZD terms add up to:

    ($5.0m+$10m) + ($15m+$20m)/0.95 + ($10m+$10m)/0.67 = $15m + $36.8m + $29.8m = $81.6m

    This is well shy of the actual total loan amount of $145.853m. One way to interpret this is that management expect borrowing interest rates to fall going forwards. Most of these hedges were taken out in November 2017, just prior to substantial acquisitions in Australia and the USA. At that time the NZ contract rate of 4%, the Australian contract swap rates of 3.4% and 3.2% and the US contract swap rate of 3.8% obviously looked good.

    SNOOPY
    Last edited by Snoopy; 28-07-2019 at 04:01 PM.
    Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •