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01-06-2016, 01:06 PM
#7611
Originally Posted by Jantar
Snoopy, I normally value your analysis, but I do believe that this time your are being overly pessimistic. What you are effectively allowing for here is for almost every single dairy loan to fail.
I will admit to making a few assumptions and not going back through the annual report in detail, but I base this claim as follows.
Assumption 1: The average dairy loan is at an LVR of 20%. So that a $260M in loans is covered by $325 in farm values, or each $1m of loan is covered by $1.25 M of security.
Assumption 2: From Pierre's quote "He said that should a dairy farm have to revert to sheep and beef the value of the operation would be around 60% of its dairy value and that with their LVR's HBL would not be too badly impacted. He is comfortable with their current level of provisioning." This means that for each $1,000,000 of loan that defaults and is foreclosed, the amount recovered is 60% of $1.25M or $0.75M. That means that for every $1M defaulted the potential write off is $0.25M.
So for a write off of $52M that would mean $208 M of defaults, or 80% of all dairy farms that HBL have loans to.
Do you really think that 80% of Dairy farms will fail?
Assumption LVR 20%??? Can this be confirmed anywhere?What are HBL loans to dairy farmers secured over?Land(valuations down 14%+),stock(down 25+%),machinery(down x%)
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01-06-2016, 01:30 PM
#7612
Originally Posted by kiora
Assumption LVR 20%??? Can this be confirmed anywhere?...
If I could confirm it, then it wouldn't be an assumption.
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01-06-2016, 01:52 PM
#7613
-aholic
Does anyone know why the bank shares, (HBL, WBC, ANZ) all took a dive by about 2-3%??
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01-06-2016, 03:52 PM
#7614
Originally Posted by Jantar
Snoopy, I normally value your analysis, but I do believe that this time your are being overly pessimistic. What you are effectively allowing for here is for almost every single dairy loan to fail.
I will admit to making a few assumptions and not going back through the annual report in detail, but I base this claim as follows.
Assumption 1: The average dairy loan is at an LVR of 20%. So that a $260M in loans is covered by $325 in farm values, or each $1m of loan is covered by $1.25 M of security.
Assumption 2: From Pierre's quote "He said that should a dairy farm have to revert to sheep and beef the value of the operation would be around 60% of its dairy value and that with their LVR's HBL would not be too badly impacted. He is comfortable with their current level of provisioning." This means that for each $1,000,000 of loan that defaults and is foreclosed, the amount recovered is 60% of $1.25M or $0.75M. That means that for every $1M defaulted the potential write off is $0.25M.
So for a write off of $52M that would mean $208 M of defaults, or 80% of all dairy farms that HBL have loans to.
Do you really think that 80% of Dairy farms will fail?
I was not quite as rigorous in my 'agricultural value' calculation as you Jantar. The main point I was trying to make was that the dairy downturn could have an effect , the order of one year's profit. Thinking about it further, I am more inclined towrads Rogers view that the total effect will be spread out over many years. Thus it will be an ongoing crimp on profits rather than one devastating blow.
Specifically, I was thinking 'cows' rather than 'land' when I made my comments. Someone posted how high the Heartland loan rates are in a comparison chart the other day. So I am thinking that Heartland is a dairy lender of last resort. The kind of lender who would lend to an unsecured sharemilker with low equity, rather than a land owning farmer. The before/after comparison then I had in mind was the drop in value a dairy cow suffers when it changes from a 'producer of milk' to 'two walking sides of beef waiting to be killed'.
Then there is the issue of working with 'average' LVRs. There could be some, relatively well heeled, land owning farmers who need seasonal bridging finance. These are not the farming loans at risk, but they would pull down the 'average' LVR. Taken individually, there is no such thing as an 'average' farmer. It is those on the high side of average (in leverage terms) that I would be most concerned for.
Finally there are the downstram effects that I did not consider. The crop farmer who has bought a combine harvester to make sileage to sell to dairy farmers. The little enginerring business that has borrowed money to help to maintain on farm dairy machinery. These are 'ripple effects' that I had in mind, but didn't soecifically allow for in my crude one line analysis.
Do I think that 80% of dairy farms will fail? No.
Do I think that Heartland could lose money across all customer sectors as a ripple effect equivalent to 80% of all of Heartland's dairy loans going down? I think it's possible!
SNOOPY
Last edited by Snoopy; 01-06-2016 at 04:09 PM.
Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7
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01-06-2016, 04:09 PM
#7615
Fyi
Originally Posted by Jantar
....
Assumption 1: The average dairy loan is at an LVR of 20%. So that a $260M in loans is covered by $325 in farm values, or each $1m of loan is covered by $1.25 M of security.
...
That is a Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) of 0.8 (80%).
Last figures I can recall from HBL was sixty something percent, but not going to bother with finding the precise figure or when that was.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
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01-06-2016, 04:26 PM
#7616
Liquidity Buffer Ratio HY2016 (Part 3)
Originally Posted by Snoopy
Time to update the Liquidity Buffer ratio for FY2015, the balance between monies borrowed and monies lent and matching up those maturity dates using a one year time horizon. The equation we are looking to satisfy is:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Expected Current Net Loan Maturity Outstanding) > 10%
On the numerator of the equation, we have borrowings.
HNZ BORROWINGS
1/ Term deposits lodged with Heartland. |
$2,097.458m |
2/ Bank Borrowings |
$465.779m |
3/ Securitized Borrowings total |
$258.630m |
4/ Subordinated Bonds |
$3.378m |
Total Borrowings of (see note 13) |
$2,825.245m |
Note 13 does not contain a clear breakdown of current and longer-term borrowing amounts and their maturity dates.
Banking facilities are provided by CBA Australia but for both Australia and New Zealand. These facilities are, I believe, in relation to the recently acquired reverse mortgage portfolio. These banking facilities are secured over the homes on which the reverse mortgages have been taken out. These loans have a maturity date of 30th September 2019. That means they are classed as ‘long term’ for accounting purposes. Heartland can’t rely on CBA Australia as a source of short-term funds.
The information given in note 13 on the securitized borrowing facilities is as follows:
-------
|
Total FY2015 |
Total FY2014 |
Facility Maturity Date FY2015 |
Securitized bank facilities total all in relation to the Heartland ABCP Trust 1 |
$350.000m |
$400.000m |
3rd February 2016 (*) |
less Current level of drawings against this facility |
$258.630m |
$228.623m |
equals Borrowing Headroom |
$91.370m {A} |
$171.377m |
(*) I do not expect any problem in rolling this facility over for another year.
--------
Expected Current Net loan Maturity Outstanding $841.755m {B}
If more money is coming in from customer loans being repaid, than is having to be repaid to the debenture holders, then this is a good thing for liquidity. That now is the case here.
Summing up:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Current Loans Outstanding)
= {A} / {B}
= $91.370m / $841.755m
= 10.8% > 10%
=> Pass Short term liquidity test (reversing the result of my most likely incorrect first iteration)
|
FY2015 |
FY2014 |
Amount lent to Customers (Receivables) |
$2,862.070m (+9.7%) |
$2,607.393m |
Total Borrowings |
$2,825.245m (+11.9%) |
$2,524.460m |
Amount borrowed from Customers (Debentures and Deposits) |
$2,097.458m (+20.8%) |
$1,736.751m |
Securitized borrowing facilities have gone down by $50m ($400m to $350m) over the same annual comparative period. So Heartland have upped their current period risk profile by having a smaller declared available loan buffer to cover any mismatch between maturing borrowings and maturing receivables.
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Current Loans Outstanding) > 10%
In the numerator of the equation, we have borrowings.
HNZ BORROWINGS
1/ Term deposits lodged with Heartland. |
$2,174.553m |
2/ Bank Borrowings |
$377.605m |
3/ Securitized Borrowings total |
$258.819m |
4/ Subordinated Bonds |
$3.381m |
Total Borrowings of (see note 7, IRFY2016) |
$2,814.358m |
Note 7 does not contain a clear breakdown of current and longer-term borrowing amounts and their maturity dates.
Banking facilities are provided by CBA Australia but for both Australia and New Zealand. These facilities are in relation to the reverse mortgage portfolio. These banking facilities are secured over the homes on which the reverse mortgages have been taken out. These loans have a maturity date of 30th September 2019. That means they are classed as ‘long term’ for accounting purposes. Additional borrowing capacity is available up until 30th June 2017, but only if certain scheduled repayments are met by the Heartland group. It follows that Heartland can’t rely on CBA Australia as a source of short-term funds.
The information given in note 7 on the securitized borrowing facilities is as follows:
-------
|
Total HY2016 |
Total FY2015 |
Facility Maturity Date HY2015 |
Securitized bank facilities total all in relation to the Heartland ABCP Trust 1 |
$350.000m |
$350.000m |
3rd August 2016 (*) |
less Current level of drawings against this facility |
$258.819m |
$258.630m |
equals Borrowing Headroom |
$91.181m {A} |
$91.370m |
(*) I do not expect any problem in rolling this facility over for another year.
-------
Summing up:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Expected Current Net Loan Maturity Outstanding)
= {A}/{B (from post Liquidity Buffer Ratio HY2016 (Part 2) }
= $91.4m / $569.701m
= 16.0% > 10%
=> Pass Short term liquidity test
|
HY2016 |
FY2015 |
Amount lent to Customers (Receivables) |
$2,928.601m (+2.3%) |
$2,862.070m |
Total Borrowings |
$2,814.338m (-0.4%) |
$2,825.245m |
Amount borrowed from Customers (Debentures and Deposits) |
$2,174.533m (+3.7%) |
$2,097.458m |
Securitized borrowing facilities are nearly constant over the six month comparative period. External Bank borrowings have reduced by $88.174m. Heartland have reduced their current period risk profile by:
1/ Having a potentially much smaller mismatch between borrowings and receivables.
2/ Sourcing more borrowed funds from Heartland bank customers, replacing borrowings from third party external banks.
SNOOPY
Last edited by Snoopy; 25-04-2017 at 11:55 PM.
Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7
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01-06-2016, 04:37 PM
#7617
Originally Posted by Paper Tiger
That is a Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) of 0.8 (80%).
Last figures I can recall from HBL was sixty something percent, but not going to bother with finding the precise figure or when that was.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
Probably wise not too seeing as land values have fallen 24% in the last year, (much worse for stock and plant and machinery and also consider that those valuations would have been anything but fresh and current as at 30 June 2015.
Snoopy - What I learned from the GFC and finance companies is that many will refinance as many impaired loans as they can possibly get away with just before balance date to "wash" their receivables ledger and make it as clean as possible for balance date muster.
Last edited by Beagle; 01-06-2016 at 04:41 PM.
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02-06-2016, 01:52 AM
#7618
Left speechless by the enormity of my memory lapse
Originally Posted by Paper Tiger
...Last figures I can recall from HBL was sixty something percent, but not going to bother with finding the precise figure or when that was....
Was looking for something else when I spotted this from the commentary accompanying the last half year results:
Given continued market interest in the dairy sector in New Zealand, Heartland advises that its direct exposure to dairy farmers is 8% of its total lending book as at 31 December 2015. The average loan to value ratio (LVR) for Heartland’s dairy exposures is 59%. However, it is important to note that LVRs are only one of the indicators of loan quality. Heartland remains cautious of market conditions and continues to monitor the dairy sector with close attention. Dairy customers are being supported through this challenging period.
So even I am wrong occasionally .
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
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02-06-2016, 09:31 AM
#7619
Originally Posted by Paper Tiger
That is a Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) of 0.8 (80%).
Last figures I can recall from HBL was sixty something percent, but not going to bother with finding the precise figure or when that was.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
Ooops. True .... 20% is borrowers equity for 80% LVR. However the 59% figure you found makes HBL's position even better.
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02-06-2016, 10:19 AM
#7620
Originally Posted by winner69
HBL +68%
NZ50 +100% (or there abouts)
From Today's presentation
Total Shareholder Return for last 3 years:
Heartland TSR: 179%
NZX 50 TSR: 89%
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