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17-06-2016, 03:23 PM
#7751
Member
Originally Posted by Germaine
If the article lives up to the headline given it by interest.co.nz, one might ask why it was not covered by an HBL announcement to the market:
Heartland Bank CFO details how any big purchase such as UDC could be funded, says reverse mortgage book picking up momentum
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17-06-2016, 03:31 PM
#7752
Originally Posted by Under Surveillance
If the article lives up to the headline given it by interest.co.nz, one might ask why it was not covered by an HBL announcement to the market:
Heartland Bank CFO details how any big purchase such as UDC could be funded, says reverse mortgage book picking up momentum
Announce what? There is nothing to announce I would have thought? YET.
Momentum in the reverse mortgage business is normal course of events for this growing bank,it's just a sector of their business.
Last edited by kizame; 17-06-2016 at 03:34 PM.
Reason: more added
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17-06-2016, 03:38 PM
#7753
If HBL could pick up UDC it would be an amazing purchase for them,but I seriously doubt with the competition out there that they would pay enough for it.Plus I think ANZ just toying with the marketplace to see what they MAY be able to get for it,I don't know whether they would seriously let it go.
Then there's MTF...
But.. They could sell for short term profit and start another finance company...
Last edited by kizame; 17-06-2016 at 03:40 PM.
Reason: adding more content
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17-06-2016, 04:12 PM
#7754
Originally Posted by kizame
If HBL could pick up UDC it would be an amazing purchase for them,but I seriously doubt with the competition out there that they would pay enough for it.Plus I think ANZ just toying with the marketplace to see what they MAY be able to get for it,I don't know whether they would seriously let it go.
Then there's MTF...
But.. They could sell for short term profit and start another finance company...
HBL CEO Jeff Greenslade was on the board of UDC.A couple of senior HBL staff members are ex UDC.So HBL know UDC.UDC would be a great fit with HBL.HBL would have to raise capital to buy UDC,,while they could buy MTF with their existing surplus capital.
REL is just another sector HBL are doing well in.I believe new online "open for business" is tracking very well too.Concentrating on new channels customers want will see more customer driven product being offered.The momentum is building.
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18-06-2016, 08:54 AM
#7755
Originally Posted by percy
The momentum is building.
As usual, you're not wrong. All the way to $1.60 by Christmas apparently.
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18-06-2016, 09:32 AM
#7756
I don't know where the sp will be at Christmas,but with "consensus forecast of 9 cents fully imputed in year 2017", I know future growing dividends will go down very nicely every Christmas.
If we go back to the 2/6/2016 Heartland presentation we can see why this momentum is building.
page 6 Heartland Strategy.
Priorities;
Market leadership in digital distribution and digital marketing, to deliver a radically better customer experience based on ease and speed.
Strong systems infrastructures to support Heartland's ambition for growth.
Last edited by percy; 19-06-2016 at 08:07 AM.
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18-06-2016, 11:01 AM
#7757
Originally Posted by kizame
If HBL could pick up UDC it would be an amazing purchase for them,but I seriously doubt with the competition out there that they would pay enough for it.Plus I think ANZ just toying with the marketplace to see what they MAY be able to get for it,I don't know whether they would seriously let it go.
Then there's MTF...
But.. They could sell for short term profit and start another finance company...
And I seriously doubt that ANZ is just toying with the marketplace here. Esanda, the (much bigger) Australian equivalent of UDC was "let go" recently in what was a clear indication of ANZ's intentions regarding finance company subsidiaries. Certainly, they will be in no hurry if offers don't meet their expectations but a full price from HBL, or others, would see a deal made. IMO.
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22-06-2016, 05:46 PM
#7758
Where did the money go? (second edition)
Originally Posted by percy
Well I think Snoopy's book is going to be a world first.
A runaway best seller.
Unique.
A business story,along the lines of a murder mystery ,but where the readers have to tell the author who dunit.!!..
Not quite a murder, but certainly a 'Where did the money go?' mystery, now revised and updated into a less than exciting second edition!
Date |
'Stressed' Loans on the books (X) |
Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y) |
(X)/(Y) |
Impaired Asset Expense (V) |
Write Off (W) |
Gross Financial Receivables (Z) |
(V)/(Z) |
(W)/(Z) |
EOHY2012 |
$87.728m |
$2,075.211m |
4.23% |
$1.854m |
$13.823m |
$2,104.591m |
0.09% |
0.66% |
EO2HY2012 |
$90.489m |
$2,078.276m |
4.35% |
$3.788m |
$3.993m |
$2,105.702m |
0.18% |
0.19% |
EOHY2013 |
$80.383m |
$2,044.793m |
3.93% |
$5.254m |
$4.824m |
$2,072.270m |
0.25% |
0.23% |
EO2HY2013 |
$48.975m |
$2,010.393m |
2.43% |
$17.313m |
$8.836m |
$2,060.867m |
0.84% |
0.43% |
EOHY2014 |
$42.498m |
$1,905.850m |
2.23% |
$3.325m |
$19.046m |
$1,940.064m |
0.17% |
0.98% |
EO2HY2014 |
$41.354m |
$2,566.039m |
1.59% |
$2.570m |
$19.472m |
$2,631.754m |
0.10% |
0.74% |
EOHY2015 |
$33.469m |
$2,722.433m |
1.23% |
$5.102m |
$1.426m |
$2,749.232m |
0.19% |
0.05% |
EO2HY2015 |
$32.824m |
$2,862.070m |
1.15% |
$7.003m |
$3.465m |
$2,893.724m |
0.24% |
0.12% |
EOHY2016 |
$29.147m |
$2,928.601m |
1.00% |
$5.610m |
$14.272m |
$2,951.075m |
0.19% |
0.48% |
Total |
|
|
|
$51.819m |
$89.157m |
|
|
|
Average |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0.25% |
0.43% |
I have made this tale less exciting by slowing down the story. It is now told exclusively in bite sized half yearly chunks.
Critically acclaimed by two well known Heartlanders
Percy: "This is the story that no-one wanted to hear, let alone rehear."
Paper Tiger: "Conceived at the bottom of a P G Wodehouse pond. Should have remained there."
Lot's of numbers here. So what does it all mean?
SNOOPY
Last edited by Snoopy; 22-06-2016 at 07:00 PM.
Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7
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22-06-2016, 05:59 PM
#7759
Originally Posted by Snoopy
Not quite a murder, but certainly a 'Where did the money go?' mystery, now revised and updated into a less than exciting second edition!
Date |
'Stressed' Loans on the books (X) |
Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y) |
(X)/(Y) |
Impaired Asset Expense (V) |
Write Off (W) |
Gross Financial Receivables (Z) |
(V)/(Z) |
(W)/(Z) |
EOHY2012 |
$87.728m |
$2,075.211m |
4.23% |
$1.854m |
$13.823m |
$2,104.591m |
0.18% |
1.32% |
EO2HY2012 |
$90.489m |
$2,078.276m |
4.35% |
$3.788m |
$3.993m |
$2,105.702m |
0.18% |
0.85% |
EOHY2013 |
$80.383m |
$2,044.793m |
3.93% |
$5.254m |
$4.824m |
$2,072.270m |
0.50% |
0.46% |
EO2HY2013 |
$48.975m |
$2,010.393m |
2.43% |
$17.313m |
$8.836m |
$2,060.867m |
0.84% |
0.42% |
EOHY2014 |
$42.498m |
$1,905.850m |
2.23% |
$3.325m |
$19.046m |
$1,940.064m |
0.34% |
1.96% |
EO2HY2014 |
$41.354m |
$2,566.039m |
1.59% |
$2.570m |
$19.472m |
$2,631.754m |
0.03% |
1.46% |
EOHY2015 |
$33.469m |
$2,722.433m |
1.23% |
$5.102m |
$1.426m |
$2,749.232m |
0.38% |
0.10% |
EO2HY2015 |
$32.824m |
$2,862.070m |
1.15% |
$7.003m |
$3.465m |
$2,893.724m |
0.24% |
0.12% |
EOHY2016 |
$29.147m |
$2,928.601m |
1.00% |
$5.610m |
$14.272m |
$2,951.075m |
0.38% |
0.96% |
Your literary skills are improving Snoopy , even I can understand that. End result, not getting any worse then, comparatively speaking.
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22-06-2016, 06:50 PM
#7760
A tale of VeeW
Originally Posted by Snoopy
Lot's of numbers here. So what does it all mean?
Just to confuse readers, I will start in the middle of the story and ask them to look at column V and column W.
Column V is a measure of what management decide they want to do to adjust the size of the impaired balance bucket, to keep things running smoothly.
Column W is a measure over the same period of what is leaking out of the impaired balance bucket, actual loans written off over that period.
We can expect Column W to be far more lumpy that Column V. This is because actual right offs and the timing of those would not be expected to follow a regular pattern. OTOH taking a longer timeframe and a portfolio view of the loans, we might expect the proportion of loans that become impaired to converge around a steady figure. The impairment provisions are there to bring everything back to this management predicted 'steady state':
Smaller adjustments are needed on average, than actual write offs over the same period.
So if this is what we might expect, what do the numbers actually tell us?
On a half yearly period basis, what I see is pretty much what I expect. But the two totals tell a different story.
Over time I would expect the impairment expenses (what is adding to the bucket) and the write off expenses (what is leaking out of the bucket) to balance out. That doesn't seem to be happening here though. This sort of imbalance can happen over the short to medium term with a healthy total impairment provision (big bucket size). However, over the longer term even the biggest bucket will run dry.
Normalising the results tell a similar story. In proportional terms too, a lot more is flowing out of the impairment bucket than is flowing into it. There are at least a couple of different ways to explain this:
1/ The quality of loans could be getting ever increasingly better.
2/ The annual loan provisioning on average is being underdone, and consequently profit on average is being overstated.
Depending on whether you are a 'fan' or not, that will decide which explanation you choose to accept.
SNOOPY
Last edited by Snoopy; 03-05-2017 at 01:54 PM.
Watch out for the most persistent and dangerous version of Covid-19: B.S.24/7
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