ANZ.NZX - Anyone holding?

[Snoopy]

During FY2016 'Heartland New Zealand Limited' and 'Heartland Bank Limited' combined into a single listed entity.

Heartland in their breakdown of the 'Asset Quality of Financial Receivables' (AR2016 Note 19a) list the following three mutually exclusive problem loan categories.

a/ Loans at least 90 days past due.
b/ Loans individually impaired.
c/ Restructured assets.

these loans are partially written off, and accounted for in the 'Provision for Impairment' (a separate listing category, d/).

My definition of a Heartland 'stressed loan' total can be calculated as follows:

'Stressed Loan Total' = (a)+(b)+(c)-(d)

The column (W) lists the actual dollar amount in bad debts written off over that period, as detailed in AR2016 note 19e.

Heartland
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Write Offs (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOHY2012	$87.728m	$2,075.211m	4.23%	$12.138m+$1.685m	$2,104.591m	0.66%
EOFY2012	$90.489m	$2,078.276m	4.35%	$14.636m+$3.180m	$2,105.702m	0.85%
EOFY2013	$48.975m	$2,010.393m	2.43%	$6.679m+$1.961m	$2,060.867m	0.42%
EOFY2014	$41.354m	$2,607.393m	1.59%	$35.258m+$3.260m	$2,631.754m	1.46%
EOFY2015	$39.066m	$2,862.070m	1.36%	$1.555m+$1.910m	$2,893.704m	0.12%
EOFY2016	$37.851m	$3,113.957m	1.21%	$12.010m+$6.653m	$3,135.203m	0.60%

The objective here is to take the Heartland figures and compare those to the equivalent figures for UDC. There are little differences in reporting standards that make this difficult.

For example, Heartland have a class of loans called 'Judgement Loans'. They pass annual judgement on these loans by rating them on a scale of 1 to 9 plus 'default'.

There is a second broad category called 'Behavioural Loans' which are separately rated, not using a 1-9 scale.

UDC appear to rate all of their loans on a scale of 1 to 8 plus default (UDC Financial Statements 2016, note 11d). I have previously defined UDC 'Vulnerable Loans' as classes 6,7 and 8. But category 6 is very large. So I am now going to change my comparative and talk about 'Stressed Loans' which are calculated by:

Take loan total from categories 7 and 8
add 'Default' loans
less Provision for Credit Impairment.

I have redefined the 'Total Financial Assets' as listed in note 11d to be 'Net Financial Receivables'. I feel it is misleading because the previously defined total if 'Provision for Credit Impairment' has already been taken off the total.

UDC
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Impaired Asset Expense (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOFY2011	$126.218m	$2,007.012m	6.29%	$15.103m	$2,049.504m	0.74%
EOFY2012	$96.670m	$2,102.299m	4.60%	$10.164m	$2,141.780m	0.47%
EOFY2013	$86.877m	$2,161.193m	4.02%	$12.399m	$2,198.653m	0.56%
EOFY2014	$95.364m	$2,344.131m	4.07%	$18.633m	$2,375.936m	0.78%
EOFY2015	$82.267m	$2,429.695m	3.39%	$12.162m	$2,461.224m	0.49%
EOFY2016	$85.475m	$2,655.841m	3.22%	$11.055m	$2,684.750m	0.41%

The key point to note here is that the 'impaired loan expense' / 'write offs' (represented by letter 'W' in each case) only occur:

1/ when that portion of the loan has gone through the whole loan review system and is 'done and dusted'. AND
2/ when a loan repayment has been missed, or a non payment is imminent

OTOH 'Stressed Loans' are very much a judgement call by management.

They may
1/ recover,
2/ stay stressed or
3/ have to be impaired, or worse, written off.

As a shareholder in either ANZ or Heartland, I would hope that management would have a robust process that identifies problem loans before they have to be written off. So as a shareholder I would hope such loans were seen as 'stressed' before an actual write off was declared. So how to check that this is what happens in reality? One way is to look at the 'stressed loans' for both companies on an annual trending basis and see how this compares with the equivalent trend in write offs.

In the case of both UDC and Heartland, the normalised stressed loan percentage is consistently going down. However, the actual write offs per year are not going down in proportion. One interpretation of this is that both companies are assuming a lower number of loan write offs will be necessary in the future (because stressed loans are reducing). However, because this is not happening, this could suggest that both companies are pumping their declared results by making insufficient stressed asset provisioning for the future.

Alternatively it could mean that both companies are getting much better at identifying what are really stressed loans, and that allows them to have relatively lower stressed asset monitoring.

What is a 'Stressed Loan'? For the purpose of this discussion, I have a special definition.

Stressed Loan Definition	UDC	Heartland
	1/ Take loan total from categories 7 and 8	a/ Take loans at least 90 days past due.
	2/ add 'Default' loans	b/ add Loans individually impaired.
		c/ add Restructured assets. (*)
	3/ less Provision for Credit Impairment	d/ less Provision for Credit Impairment.'
	4/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans'	e/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans''

(*). (Note that from FY2017 ' Restructured Assets' are now not reported on by Heartland.)


A 'Stressed Loan' can be thought of as a kind of 'Vulnerable Loan', as previously described, but with the Impairment provision taken out. There is no overlap between a 'stressed loan', as defined here, and the amount of money written off each year in bad debts. But yes, 'Stressed Loans' are very much a judgement call by management.

They may
1/ recover,
2/ stay stressed or
3/ have to be written off.

As a shareholder in either ANZ (owner of UDC) or Heartland:

1/ I would hope that management would have a robust process that identifies problem loans before they have to be written off.
2/ So as a shareholder, I would hope such loans were seen as 'stressed' before being classified as 'impaired' and certainly before an actual write off was declared.

How does one check that this is what happens in reality? One way could be to look at the 'stressed loans' for both companies on an annual trending basis and see how this compares with the equivalent annual trend in write offs.


Heartland

The column (W) lists the actual dollar amount in bad debts written off over that period, as detailed in AR2017 note 19e.

The key point to note here is that the 'impaired loan expense' / 'write offs' (represented by letter 'W' in each case) only occur:

1/ when the impaired portion of the loan has gone through the whole loan review system'. AND
2/ when a loan repayment has been missed, or a non payment is imminent

Heartland
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Write Offs (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOHY2012	$87.728m	$2,075.211m	4.23%	$12.138m+$1.685m	$2,104.591m	0.66%
EOFY2012	$90.489m	$2,078.276m	4.35%	$14.636m+$3.180m	$2,105.702m	0.85%
EOFY2013	$48.975m	$2,010.393m	2.43%	$6.679m+$1.961m	$2,060.867m	0.42%
EOFY2014	$41.354m	$2,607.393m	1.59%	$35.258m+$3.260m	$2,631.754m	1.46%
EOFY2015	$39.066m	$2,862.070m	1.36%	$1.555m+$1.910m	$2,893.704m	0.12%
EOFY2016	$37.851m	$3,113.957m	1.21%	$12.010m+$6.653m	$3,135.203m	0.60%
EOFY2017	$38.341m	$3,545.896m	1.08%	$2.140m+$9.531m	$3,567.191m	0.33%

Note: During FY2016 'Heartland New Zealand Limited' and 'Heartland Bank Limited' combined into a single listed entity.


UDC

I have redefined the 'Total Financial Assets' as listed in note 10d to be 'Net Financial Receivables', because they have already had their 'Provision for Credit Impairment' deducted (netted off).

UDC
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Impaired Asset Expense (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOFY2011	$126.218m	$2,007.012m	6.29%	$15.103m	$2,049.504m	0.74%
EOFY2012	$96.670m	$2,102.299m	4.60%	$10.164m.	$2,141.780m	0.47%
EOFY2013	$86.877m	$2,161.193m	4.02%	$12.399m	$2,198.653m	0.56%
EOFY2014	$95.364m	$2,344.131m	4.07%	$21.933m	$2,375.936m	0.92%
EOFY2015	$82.267m	$2,429.695m	3.39%	$11.503m	$2,461.224m	0.47%
EOFY2016	$85.475m	$2,655.841m	3.22%	$12.352m	$2,684.750m	0.46%
EOFY2017	$116.131m	$2,975.781m	3.90%	$4.838m	$3,005.059m	0.16%

Discussion

In the case of Heartland, the 'stressed loan' percentage is consistently going down. However, the actual write offs per year do not show an obvious correlation to the same year's 'stressed loan' figure. In FY2014, for example, the quantum of write offs are almost equal to the quantum of stressed loans. Yet one year later (FY2015) the write offs are only less than one tenth of the stressed loans. Will the case of FY2016 and FY2017, where stressed loans are two to three times the amount actually written off become the new norm?
.
In the case of UDC, the stressed loans look to float around at 4% of the total, much higher than the Heartland equivalents of recent years. For FY2017 only, the 'Impaired Asset Expense' to 'Gross Financial Receivables' is startlingly low, even as the stressed loans jumped up. A one year aberration? Despite making my own interpretation of how to define a 'stressed loan' at UDC - to bring the number more into line with what happens at Heartland - the stressed loan percentage at UDC remains stubbornly high in comparison. UDC loans are perhaps more heavily weighted towards 'working equipment' which may not have much 'fire sale' value during a business downturn. So could it just be in the nature of the UDC business that management need to keep a really close eye on a large portion of their loans? How they do this, while using a skeleton staff compared to Heartland, remains a mystery to me!

What would I like to see in these figures? If you accept that:

1/ When a loan is written off it is largely too late to fix it, AND
2/ The overall number of write offs can be contained (it is inevitable that in any lending organisation, some loans will have to be written off)

THEN I am interested in how management deals with 'stressed loans' before they get to that stage.

My concern is that the write offs at UDC over FY2017 are exceptionally low, and there is an unusual incentive for management to project the result like this (UDC is up for sale). Write offs are also down at Heartland over the comparable period (which could indicate a favourable market to lenders), but not by as much. The percentage of 'stressed loans' at UDC remains significantly comparatively higher than Heartland. There are a couple of ways to interpret that:

Either:

1/ UDC staff remain 'exceptionally diligent' in reviewing stressed loans (as assessed by UDC) and this policy is leading to lower and lower actual write offs.
2/ UDC are being exceptionally lenient in classifying some loans as stressed when really they should be wholly or partially impaired or maybe even written off.

I would have expected more 'exceptional diligence' from Heartland, simply because they have more staff. The Heartland pattern of reducing 'write offs' coupled with reducing 'stressed loans' does make a plausible narrative. But I am concerned that some of those UDC stressed loans may be a little more stressed than UDC management are letting on. It is hard to be definitive about one year's results. In the meantime I would be cautious in assessing the UDC write off picture.

SNOOPY

[Snoopy]

What is a 'Stressed Loan'? For the purpose of this discussion, I have a special definition.

Stressed Loan Definition	UDC	Heartland
	1/ Take loan total from categories 7 and 8	a/ Take loans at least 90 days past due.
	2/ add 'Default' loans	b/ add Loans individually impaired.
		c/ add Restructured assets. (*)
	3/ less Provision for Credit Impairment	d/ less Provision for Credit Impairment.'
	4/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans'	e/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans''

(*). (Note that from FY2017 ' Restructured Assets' are now not reported on by Heartland.)


A 'Stressed Loan' can be thought of as a kind of 'Vulnerable Loan', as previously described, but with the Impairment provision taken out. There is no overlap between a 'stressed loan', as defined here, and the amount of money written off each year in bad debts. But yes, 'Stressed Loans' are very much a judgement call by management.

They may
1/ recover,
2/ stay stressed or
3/ have to be written off.

As a shareholder in either ANZ (owner of UDC) or Heartland:

1/ I would hope that management would have a robust process that identifies problem loans before they have to be written off.
2/ So as a shareholder, I would hope such loans were seen as 'stressed' before being classified as 'impaired' and certainly before an actual write off was declared.

How does one check that this is what happens in reality? One way could be to look at the 'stressed loans' for both companies on an annual trending basis and see how this compares with the equivalent annual trend in write offs.


Heartland

The column (W) lists the actual dollar amount in bad debts written off over that period, as detailed in AR2017 note 19e.

The key point to note here is that the 'impaired loan expense' / 'write offs' (represented by letter 'W' in each case) only occur:

1/ when the impaired portion of the loan has gone through the whole loan review system'. AND
2/ when a loan repayment has been missed, or a non payment is imminent

Heartland
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Write Offs (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOHY2012	$87.728m	$2,075.211m	4.23%	$12.138m+$1.685m	$2,104.591m	0.66%
EOFY2012	$90.489m	$2,078.276m	4.35%	$14.636m+$3.180m	$2,105.702m	0.85%
EOFY2013	$48.975m	$2,010.393m	2.43%	$6.679m+$1.961m	$2,060.867m	0.42%
EOFY2014	$41.354m	$2,607.393m	1.59%	$35.258m+$3.260m	$2,631.754m	1.46%
EOFY2015	$39.066m	$2,862.070m	1.36%	$1.555m+$1.910m	$2,893.704m	0.12%
EOFY2016	$37.851m	$3,113.957m	1.21%	$12.010m+$6.653m	$3,135.203m	0.60%
EOFY2017	$38.341m	$3,545.896m	1.08%	$2.140m+$9.531m	$3,567.191m	0.33%

Note: During FY2016 'Heartland New Zealand Limited' and 'Heartland Bank Limited' combined into a single listed entity.


UDC

I have redefined the 'Total Financial Assets' as listed in note 10d to be 'Net Financial Receivables', because they have already had their 'Provision for Credit Impairment' deducted (netted off).

UDC
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Impaired Asset Expense (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOFY2011	$126.218m	$2,007.012m	6.29%	$15.103m	$2,049.504m	0.74%
EOFY2012	$96.670m	$2,102.299m	4.60%	$10.164m.	$2,141.780m	0.47%
EOFY2013	$86.877m	$2,161.193m	4.02%	$12.399m	$2,198.653m	0.56%
EOFY2014	$95.364m	$2,344.131m	4.07%	$21.933m	$2,375.936m	0.92%
EOFY2015	$82.267m	$2,429.695m	3.39%	$11.503m	$2,461.224m	0.47%
EOFY2016	$85.475m	$2,655.841m	3.22%	$12.352m	$2,684.750m	0.46%
EOFY2017	$116.131m	$2,975.781m	3.90%	$4.838m	$3,005.059m	0.16%

Discussion

In the case of Heartland, the 'stressed loan' percentage is consistently going down. However, the actual write offs per year do not show an obvious correlation to the same year's 'stressed loan' figure. In FY2014, for example, the quantum of write offs are almost equal to the quantum of stressed loans. Yet one year later (FY2015) the write offs are only less than one tenth of the stressed loans. Will the case of FY2016 and FY2017, where stressed loans are two to three times the amount actually written off become the new norm?
.
In the case of UDC, the stressed loans look to float around at 4% of the total, much higher than the Heartland equivalents of recent years. For FY2017 only, the 'Impaired Asset Expense' to 'Gross Financial Receivables' is startlingly low, even as the stressed loans jumped up. A one year aberration? Despite making my own interpretation of how to define a 'stressed loan' at UDC - to bring the number more into line with what happens at Heartland - the stressed loan percentage at UDC remains stubbornly high in comparison. UDC loans are perhaps more heavily weighted towards 'working equipment' which may not have much 'fire sale' value during a business downturn. So could it just be in the nature of the UDC business that management need to keep a really close eye on a large portion of their loans? How they do this, while using a skeleton staff compared to Heartland, remains a mystery to me!

What would I like to see in these figures? If you accept that:

1/ When a loan is written off it is largely too late to fix it, AND
2/ The overall number of write offs can be contained (it is inevitable that in any lending organisation, some loans will have to be written off) [TR]
[TD]EOFY2014[/TD][TD=align:right]$43.354m[/TD][TD=align:right]$2,607.393m[/TD][TD=align:right]1.66%[/TD][TD=align:right]$35.258m+$3.260m[/TD][TD=align:right]$2,631.754m[/TD][TD=align:right]1.46%[/TD]
[/TR]

THEN I am interested in how management deals with 'stressed loans' before they get to that stage.

My concern is that the write offs at UDC over FY2017 are exceptionally low, and there is an unusual incentive for management to project the result like this (UDC is up for sale). Write offs are also down at Heartland over the comparable period (which could indicate a favourable market to lenders), but not by as much. The percentage of 'stressed loans' at UDC remains significantly comparatively higher than Heartland. There are a couple of ways to interpret that:

Either:

1/ UDC staff remain 'exceptionally diligent' in reviewing stressed loans (as assessed by UDC) and this policy is leading to lower and lower actual write offs.
2/ UDC are being exceptionally lenient in classifying some loans as stressed when really they should be wholly or partially impaired or maybe even written off.

I would have expected more 'exceptional diligence' from Heartland, simply because they have more staff. The Heartland pattern of reducing 'write offs' coupled with reducing 'stressed loans' does make a plausible narrative. But I am concerned that some of those UDC stressed loans may be a little more stressed than UDC management are letting on. It is hard to be definitive about one year's results. In the meantime I would be cautious in assessing the UDC write off picture.

What is a 'Stressed Loan'? For the purpose of this discussion, I have a special definition.

Stressed Loan Definition	UDC	Heartland
	1/ Take loan total from categories 7 and 8	a/ Take loans at least 90 days past due.
	2/ add 'Default' loans	b/ add Loans individually impaired.
		c/ add Restructured assets. (*)
	3/ less Provision(s) for Credit Impairment{s)	d/ less Provision(s) for Credit Impairment(s)
	4/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans'	e/ equals 'Total Stressed Loans''

(*). (Note that from FY2017 ' Restructured Assets' are now not reported on separately by Heartland.)


A 'Stressed Loan' can be thought of as a kind of 'Vulnerable Loan', as previously described (my post 352), but with the Impairment provision taken out. There is no overlap between a 'stressed loan', as defined here, and the amount of money written off each year in bad debts. But yes, 'Stressed Loans' are very much a judgement call by management.

They may
1/ recover,
2/ stay stressed or
3/ have to be impaired and later written off.

As a shareholder in either ANZ (owner of UDC) or Heartland:

1/ I would hope that management would have a robust process that identifies problem loans before they have to be written off.
2/ So as a shareholder, I would hope such loans were seen as 'stressed' before being classified as 'impaired' and certainly before an actual write off was declared.

How does one check that this is what happens in reality? One way could be to look at the 'stressed loans' for both companies on an annual trending basis and see how this compares with the equivalent annual trend in write offs.


Heartland

The column (W) lists the actual dollar amount in bad debts written off over that period, as detailed in AR2018 note 20e.

The key point to note here is that the 'impaired loan expense' / 'write offs' (represented by letter 'W' in each case) only occur:

1/ when the impaired portion of the loan has gone through the whole loan review system'. AND
2/ when a loan repayment has been missed, or a non payment is imminent

Heartland
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Write Offs (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOFY2013	$48.074m	$2,010.376m	2.39%	$6.679m+$1.081m	$2,060.867m	0.377%
EOFY2014	$43.354m	$2,607.393m	1.66%	$35.258m+$3.260m	$2,631.754m	1.46%
EOFY2015	$32.824m	$2,862.070m	1.15%	$1.555m+$1.910m	$2,893.724m	0.120%
EOFY2016	$32.894m	$3,113.957m	1.06%	$12.010m+$6.653m	$3,140.105m	0.594%
EOFY2017	$34.490m	$3,545.896m	0.973%	$2.140m+$9.531m	$3,575.613m	0.327%
EOFY2018	$43.278m	$3,984.941m	1.06%	$4.546m+$14.924m	$4,017.436m	0.485%

Note: During FY2016 'Heartland New Zealand Limited' and 'Heartland Bank Limited' combined into a single listed entity.


UDC

I have redefined the 'Total Financial Assets' as listed in note 10d to be 'Net Financial Receivables', because they have already had their 'Provision for Credit Impairment' deducted (netted off).

UDC
Date	'Stressed' Loans on the books (X)	Net Financial Receivables (Impairments deducted) (Y)	(X)/(Y)	Impaired Asset Expense (W)	Gross Financial Receivables (Z)	(W)/(Z)
EOFY2014	$95.364m	$2,344.131m	4.07%	$15.333m	$2,375.936m	0.645%
EOFY2015	$82.267m	$2,429.695m	3.39%	$11.503m	$2,461.224m	0.467%
EOFY2016	$85.475m	$2,655.841m	3.22%	$9.753m	$2,684.750m	0.363%
EOFY2017	$116.131m	$2,975.781m	3.90%	$10.558m	$3,005.059m	0.351%
EOFY2018	$93.502m	$3,283.630m	2.85%	$8.875m	$3,318.198m	0.268%

Note: The 'impaired asset expense' in the table above is NOT the same as the 'credit provision charge' in the UDC income statement. The former is the cash taken off the books in a calendar year because certain impaired assets have been completely or partially written off. The credit provision charge is an annual adjustment to the 'provision for impairment'.

Discussion

I will preface this discussion by saying that, in previous years, I have made a bit of a hash of things in my tabulated calculations above. Some of this hash was because I have now changed my mind on what ingredients made up the final number. But my major mistake was made looking at UDC There I added "Collective Provision charge to the Statement of Comprehensive Income" (effectively a cash charge as I see it now) to the 'Individual provision bad debts written off' (also a cash charge) without changing the sign of the latter. The latter had a negative sign in front of it - because it was shown in the 'Provision of Credit Impairment' Note as reducing a provision. Absolutely correct, nothing wrong with that presentation. But I wanted to use that figure in a different context of 'cash movement'. 'Individual provision bad debts written off' represents cash out during the year and so does any charge made to the 'Statement of Comprehensive Income' for the year. I should have added these two 'cash out' numbers together, and now I have done just that, I should conclude by saying that, despite these errors, the general thrust of my previous argument has not been affected.

I ended last year's discussion expressing my doubts about the ever decreasing write-off rate at UDC, while the 'stressed loans' did not show such a trend. We are now at the end of FY2018 and the write off rate has dropped again, although this time the stressed loan count is down as well. We mammals like to look for correlations. But I am going to put forward an alternative explanation as to why the 'stressed loans' and 'write offs' should not be correlated. Suppose, as the owner of UDC, you wanted to sell it and were keen for the business to be marketed in the best possible light. Would it not be sensible to really cast your eye more closely that usual over the stressed loan portfolio? That way you could bring about more early interventions to make sure not as many 'stressed' loans became 'distressed'. The counter argument to that is: Why would you wait for a whole of business sale to implement a best practice policy? And isn't it equally important to focus on stopping the unstressed part of the loan book becoming stressed at any time? Wouldn't any decent manager do all this anyway? The UDC sale, in one form or another, was very much on the table during FY2018. So I think it is still too early to say if the lower write off expenses at UDC can be sustained. My critical eye remains on UDC in this regard.

In the case of Heartland, the 'stressed loan' percentage went down with a thump as Heartland extracted itself from its legacy property problems over FY2013 and FY2014.. Stressed loans have reached a plateau of about 1%. The actual write offs at Heartland were very high in FY2014, and that year should be seen as an outlier. There is a pattern of up and down years (highs and lows correcting each other over time?) averaging some 0.45%. This contrasts with the monotonic decline at UDC

The UDC stressed loans look floats around at 4% of the total. This is much higher than Heartland. But this could be due to the nature of the business rather than management incompetence. UDC loans are perhaps more heavily weighted towards 'working equipment' which may not have much 'fire sale' value during a business downturn. Yet I would have expected more diligence from Heartland, simply because they have more staff. The Heartland pattern of reducing 'write offs' coupled with reducing 'stressed loans' does make a more plausible narrative than what is happening at UDC.

SNOOPY

[winner69]

Big day for Aussie banks today with the Royal Commission Report coming out

Some say the shorters of banking stocks could get hurt

[peat]

And yet , from the AFR

Opinion
Shorting the big four banks: widow-maker no more?
https://www.afr.com/news/economy/sho...0190203-h1asf7 (only the first paragraph for free)